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Prescribed Marijuana to Terminally Ill Patients
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Matthew Segal*
[The] sluggishness of government, the multitude of matters that
clamor for attention, and the relative ease with which men are
persuaded to postpone troublesome decisions, all make inertia one
of the most decisive powers in determining the course of our affairs
and frequently gives to the established order of things a longevity
and vitality much beyond its merits.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Father Earle Rowell once called marijuana the "weed of mad-
ness. '' 2  Given the nature of the current debate over medicinal
marijuana use in the United States, his statement seems prophetic.
Patients seriously ill with cancer, multiple sclerosis, and AIDS are
being denied access to pain relief recommended by licensed physi-
cians.3 The federal government is threatening to imprison these
physicians and their patients if marijuana is prescribed to them. This
is so even in states where marijuana has been legalized for medical use
t In memory of Ralph Seely.
* J.D. Candidate 1999, Seattle University School of Law; Clerk, Supreme Court of Wash-
ington, the Hon. Charles W. Johnson, 1999-2000; Clerk, Supreme Court of Washington, the
Hon. Gerry Alexander, 2000-2001. Thanks to Karen Jensen, Kerry Everett, Professor David
Skover and, of course, the carpool (Tana, Nicole, and John). Special thanks to Corrie Greene and
my family.
1. Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
2. RUFUS KING, THE DRUG HANG-UP: AMERICA'S FIFTY YEAR FOLLY 75-76 (1972).
Father Rowell preached against the dangers of marijuana during the Great Depression. ld.
3. See, e.g., Seeley v. State, 132 Wash. 2d 776, 940 P.2d 604 (1997). The plaintiff was
suffering from chordoma, a form of terminal bone cancer. One of his physicians recommended
that he inhale marijuana to ease the pain and nausea from chemotherapy. Seeley then sought and
received a declaratory judgment that the legal classification of marijuana, which prevented him
from using it for this purpose, violated the Washington Constitution. The Supreme Court of
Washington reversed the decision. See Brief of Respondent at 2-6, Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 776,
940 P.2d at 604 (No. 63534-0).
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by popular initiative.4 One state legislature has overturned a popular
initiative on marijuana use that was adopted by a more than 2-1
margin.5  Whatever one's position on the prospect of legalized
medicinal marijuana use, one can hardly support the current state of
affairs. Change, one way or another, is a legitimate objective. The
question is how this change can and should be implemented, and for
what reasons. To examine this issue, consider the following hypotheti-
cal.
William Cohen is an attorney.6 Before law school, he was a
newspaper columnist and reporter, as well as the managing editor of a
small aviation magazine. He was also an avid backpacker, fly
fisherman, and horseback rider. Once, when he was covering a news
story about a woman accused of sexual molestation, he was so sure that
she was innocent and did not get a fair trial that he decided to become
an attorney. After graduating from law school, he became heavily
involved in civil rights work and won a nine million dollar verdict in
an employment discrimination case. Through it all, Cohen also carried
with him the knowledge that he had a terminal disease.
While still a reporter, Cohen was diagnosed with bone cancer. It
started when he developed a sore tailbone from horseback riding.
Eventually, surgeons discovered and removed a tumor from the base
of his spine. For awhile, it looked as if he had beaten the cancer, but
it returned while he was in law school. The result was eight additional
4. See Federal News Service, White House Briefing News Conference, December 30, 1996
[hereinafter White House Briefing]. In particular, U.S. Attorney Janet Reno said "U.S. Attorneys
in [California and Arizona] will continue to review cases for prosecution and DEA officials will
review cases as they have to determine whether to revoke the registration of any physician who
recommends or prescribes so-called Schedule I controlled substances. We will not turn a blind
eye toward our responsibility to enforce federal law and to preserve the integrity of medical and
scientific process to determine if drugs have medical value before allowing them to be used." See
also John Ritter, Medical Marijuana: Legal, but for how long?, USA TODAY, February 15, 1998,
at 10A, in which Chuck Thomas, a spokesman for the Marijuana Policy Project in Washington,
warned that "[t]he bottom line has been reinforced once more: Medical users can be sent to
prison."
5. The Arizona legislature substantially revised Proposition 200, approved by the voters in
1996. The original proposition had legalized, with certain restrictions, the medical use of
marijuana, but the new enactment made legalization dependent on federal legalization either by
Congress or by approval of the Drug Enforcement Administration. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3412.01 (West 1997), and the accompanying historical and statutory notes. See also 1997
Ariz. Sess. Laws 124 § 3-5; 246 § 3.
6. This hypothetical is based on the life of Ralph Seeley. The hypothetical was constructed
from the following sources: Seeley v. State, 132 Wash. 2d 776, 940 P.2d 604 (1997); Brief of
Respondent at 2-6, Seeley (No. 63534-0); Interviews with Ralph Seeley, in Tacoma, Wash.
(October 29, 1997), (December 23, 1997); Jean M. Hilde, Seeley Wages Battle with Cancer and
Violators of Civil Rights, TRIAL NEWS, March 1996, at 25; Rachel Zimmerman, Marijuana Mercy
Campaigner Lies in Coma, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, January 20, 1998, at B1.
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surgeries and ongoing chemotherapy. The cancer caused intense pain,
while the chemotherapy led to violent bouts of nausea. Extreme
weight loss also followed. Sometimes, Cohen was so debilitated that
he ended up on the floor in his own excrement and vomit.
Due to these symptoms, Cohen's oncologist, Dr. Allen, who is
well respected in his field, prescribed him Marinol, a synthetic form of
THC, the active ingredient in marijuana. No other drugs were
working to kill the pain or give Cohen an appetite. The Marinol did
help control his nausea, but William usually could not swallow the
pills to begin with. Additionally, the effects of the pills were so strong
that they knocked him out for fourteen hours or more. Cohen asked
his oncologist if he could smoke marijuana instead of ingesting the
synthetic THC pills. His oncologist agreed that this was the best
option, but it was also illegal. While he wanted to write Cohen a
prescription for leaf marijuana, to do so would make both men
criminals and could lead to the loss of rights to practice law or
medicine as well as a term in prison. This is because federal law does
not recognize the right to prescribe marijuana for medical purposes.
Under the Federal Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, marijuana is a Schedule I substance.7 This means that it has a
high potential for abuse, that there is a lack of accepted safety for the
use of the drug under medical supervision, that the drug has no
currently accepted medical use in the United States, and that it is not
available by medical prescription. Along with marijuana, Schedule I
contains heroin and LSD.8
This Comment is based on the premise that, were William Cohen
to attack the constitutionality of marijuana's classification as a Schedule
I substance, the appropriate result under the current substantive due
process jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court would
conclude that this classification violates the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.9 Since marijuana's placement in
Schedule I prevents any form of medical marijuana use, it denies a
limited class of seriously ill individuals the right to effective pain relief
and proper consultation with a physician. This impinges on funda-
7. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1997); 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (1997).
8. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (1997).
9. Almost as important as what this Comment will address is what it will not. This
Comment will not suggest that there is a constitutional basis for a blanket legalization of drugs.
It will not argue that there is a constitutional basis for private recreational use of drugs, including
marijuana. And it will not argue that all individuals should have a constitutional right to the
medical use of marijuana. This Comment's sole focus will be the right to the medical use of
marijuana by the narrow class of people including William Cohen.
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mental rights held by William Cohen and others without a compelling
state interest to justify such an intrusion.1"
Section II of the Comment will begin with a brief history of the
medical use of marijuana in western culture and the United States. It
will then examine the existing federal statutory scheme governing the
use of marijuana and conclude with a look at current beliefs about the
medical value of marijuana. Section III will analyze previous attempts
to collaterally attack the scheduling of marijuana through the courts
and show why those efforts have generally failed. Section IV will
perform a substantive due process analysis of William Cohen's case
and submit that Mr. Cohen has a fundamental right to consult with his
physician to ease severe pain. It will then balance this right against the
relevant state interests, which it will suggest are illusory. Finally,
Section V will examine the policies supporting judicial, as opposed to
legislative, solutions to the medicinal marijuana problem and will
conclude that judicial action is the only method likely to bring about
necessary change.
II. THE HISTORY OF MEDICINAL MARIJUANA USE AND
REGULATION IN WESTERN CULTURE AND THE UNITED STATES
This section will discuss the history of marijuana's medicinal use
and legal regulation. It will demonstrate that there is an historical
basis for marijuana as medicine, and that the current status of
marijuana as a Schedule I substance is a politically-based, and not a
medically -based, decision.
A. Pre-1970: Free Use, Prohibition, and Narcotics Taxes
Marijuana has a history of medicinal use arguably dating back
thousands of years. In ancient China, for example, Han Dynasty
writers included it in a medical treatise dating back to the fourth
century B.C." A noted early Chinese physician, Hua T'o, used
hemp as an anesthetic. 2
10. The Fifth Amendment reads in relevant part "No person shall be... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth
Amendment applies to federal controlled substance legislation. Similar legislation passed by the
states would be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment: "No state shall ... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
This Comment will focus on the constitutionality of the relevant federal laws under the Fifth
Amendment.
11. See P. HUARD & M. WONG, CHINESE MEDICINE 10 (1968).
12. See id. at 16.
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During the nineteenth century, marijuana was also used for
medicinal purposes in Great Britain, with Queen Victoria apparently
among the patients who utilized it. 3 In 1893, in response to ques-
tions in the House of Commons about marijuana usage in India, the
Indian Hemp Drugs Commission convened to study marijuana usage
and its effects. After a year's worth of extensive hearings, the
commission concluded, among other things, that while extensive use
of marijuana could be harmful, small doses could be beneficial.14
In the United States, the medical qualities of marijuana began to
be recognized around 1840.1$ Throughout the nineteenth century, it
was used as an anticonvulsant and an analgesic as well as to treat
rheumatism, epilepsy, and tetanus.' 6 In 1850, marijuana was added
to the United States Pharmacopoeia. 7 Perhaps it should come as no
surprise then that when America passed its first major drug laws of the
twentieth century, marijuana was not among the items taxed or
regulated. 8 This changed with the arrival of Harry Anslinger as the
head of the U.S. Narcotics Bureau in 1930, the same year that the
Bureau became an independent unit of the Treasury Department.
Anslinger was instrumental in the passage of the Marijuana Tax Act
of 1937.19
Playing upon the marijuana frenzy, fueled in the late '20s and
early '30s by Father Rowell, who traveled across the country destroy-
13. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 800, 940 P.2d at 628, n.10 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
14. Marijuana: Report of the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission 1893-94, Vol. I. 264, 287, 359
(Silver Spring, Md., Thomas Jefferson Publishing Company) (1969). The Commission noted
that, given its findings, "[t]otal prohibition of the cultivation of the hemp plant for narcotics, and
of the manufacture, sale, or use of the drugs derived from it, is neither necessary nor expedient
in consideration of their ascertained effects .... Id.
15. Gregg A. Bilz, The Medical Use of Marijuana: The Politics of Medicine, 13 HAMLINE
J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 117 (1992). For summaries of the early medicinal use of marijuana in the
United States, see generally Bilz, supra this note at 117-21; Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 800, 940 P.2d
at 628, n.10 (Sanders, J., dissenting); LESTER GRINSPOON M.D., MARIJUANA RECONSIDERED
5-13 (2d ed. 1977).
16. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 800, 940 P.2d at 628, n.10 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
17. Bilz, supra note 15, at 118.
18. See generally Act of February 9, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 614 (prohibiting
importing of opium for nonmedicinal use); Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223,
38 Stat. 785, (amended February 24, 1919, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057, 1130). The
Harrison Act imposed an excise tax on opium, coca leaves, and their various extracts and placed
limits on the distribution and sale of opium and cocaine. The Act did not apply to the medical
dispensing of drugs as part of a professional medical or dental practice. For a more detailed
analysis of the Harrison Act and the climate in which it was passed, see KING, supra note 2, at
15-22, 33-39.
19. Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551. For details of Harry Anslinger's rise through the
ranks, his appointment to the Bureau of Narcotics, and his political campaign against marijuana,
see KING, supra note 2, at 69-77.
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ing hemp fields and preaching against marijuana use, Anslinger
threw his support behind several marijuana bills introduced to the 75th
Congress. Congressional committees were told how marijuana and
hashish had ravaged the ancient Muslim world, how studies in Tunisia
showed that marijuana caused violent crimes, addiction, sterility, and
insanity, and how high school students used marijuana with "deadly"
effects.21
Significantly, the American Medical Association (AMA) opposed
the passage of the Tax Act.22 AMA spokesman Dr. William C.
Woodward told the House of Representatives that marijuana did in
fact have valid medical uses. He demanded to know why hard
evidence of the sensational allegations of crime and addiction had not
been produced. Dr. Woodward's testimony was largely disregarded,
however, and the Tax Act became law. Its ultimate impact was to
impose registration duties and record-keeping requirements that made
marijuana more expensive and more difficult for physicians to
prescribe. 24 In 1942, marijuana was removed from the United States
Pharmacopoeia.25
Another result of the Tax Act was the near impossibility of
further research on the medicinal effects of marijuana. Doctors or
scientists had to obtain permits in order to conduct such research, and
these permits were consistently denied by the Bureau of Narcotics. 26
One noteworthy study that was conducted shortly after the Tax Act
was commissioned by New York Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia. The
study examined the physical and psychological effects of marijuana, as
well as some of the specific allegations made at the Tax Act hearings.
Its conclusions included the pronouncement that the horror stories told
about marijuana were generally unwarranted.27
Initially, the American Medical Association praised the study and
continued to remind people of various medical uses of marijuana. 28
Shortly thereafter, however, arguably due to intense political pressure,
the AMA reversed course and attacked the final La Guardia findings
as unscientific. 29 Following the backlash from the La Guardia study,
20. See KING, supra note 2, at 75-76.
21. KING, supra note 2, at 75-76.
22. See id. at 76.
23. See id. at 77.
24. Bilz, supra note 15, at 118.
25. Id.
26. See KING, supra note 2, at 82.
27. See id. at 83.
28. Bilz, supra note 15, at 121.
29. See KING, supra note 2, at 84-85.
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marijuana became a political hot potato in the scientific community,
with doctors and scientists either unwilling to risk their reputations or
unable to get the necessary permits to pursue further studies. While
eighty-seven marijuana research projects had been licensed by the
government in 1948, by 1958 the number was down to six.3"
The political climate was also felt in the federal judicial system.
In 1949, Federal District Judge William T. McCarthy, in considering
a marijuana case, distinguished between marijuana and opium:
After all, opium, or any of its derivatives-and this is not one-have
a therapeutic value. They bring consolation to the sick and dying;
they make their last days on this earth comfortable. But marijuana
has no therapeutic value whatsoever. It has been responsible for the
commission of crimes of violence, of murder and of rape. Those are
two major tributaries that flow from this use of marijuana. I don't
say misuse of it. It has no value of any kind."
The 1950s and 1960s saw an increase in the penalties for use and
possession of marijuana and other narcotics, as well as the advent of
state laws criminalizing marijuana.32 Indeed, by 1965, possession of
marijuana was a crime in all 50 states. Yet even then, almost all the
laws at least nominally had exceptions for "(1) state-licensed manufac-
turers and wholesalers; (2) apothecaries; (3) researchers; (4) physicians,
dentists, veterinarians, and certain other medical personnel; (5) agents
or employees of the foregoing persons or common carriers; (6) persons
for whom the drug had been prescribed or to whom it had been given
by an authorized medical person; and (7) certain public officials."33
These exceptions would not to be found, however, in the next stage of
federal drug regulation, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970.
30. See id. at 85.
31. Id. at 88. This passage was included in the Bureau of Narcotics Annual Report for
1949, and hailed as "The Sound Policy of a United States District Judge." See also Caudillo v.
United States, 253 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1958), where the court held:
There exists the possibility of lawful possession of opium derivatives, or other narcotics,
for they have definite therapeutic medical values and a scientific need exists for their
possession by many doctors and almost every hospital in the United States. But this
Court knows of no medical or scientific use to be made of marihuana, save perhaps for
occasional testing, in order to make scientific comparisons with other narcotics,
barbiturates and amphetamines.
32. See generally KING, supra note 2, at 89-92; Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 16
(1969).
33. Leary, 395 U.S. at 17 (citing Uniform Narcotic Drug Act § 3-11, 9B Unif. L.A. 472-496
(1966); N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 3310, 3320-25, 3330-33 (1954 and Supp. 1968-1969); Tex. Pen.
Code, Art. 725b, §§ 5-12 (1961)).
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B. 1970-1994: Drug Schedules and the Attempts to
Reschedule Marijuana
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970 ("the Act") had several goals, among them: the unification of the
various drug enforcement and policy efforts in the United States, the
application of the norms and practices agreed upon at the 1961
International Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and an inherent
flexibility to account for changes in the drug scene and in society as a
whole.34
To assure the desired flexibility, the Act created a series of drug
schedules, dividing substances into various categories and leaving open
the possibility that drugs could be rescheduled in the future.35
Schedule I contains substances with a high potential for abuse, no
currently accepted medical use in the United States, and a lack of
accepted safety for use of the substance under medical supervision.
Among the items in Schedule I are heroin, LSD, and marijuana.37
No medical prescriptions are available for Schedule I substances.38
Schedule II also contains drugs with a high potential for abuse.39
Unlike Schedule I, however, Schedule II drugs do have a currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, and thus even
though they may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence,
they are available upon a written nonrefillable prescription.4" Sched-
ule II includes various opiates, morphine, cocaine, amphetamines,
barbiturates, and PCP.41 Schedules II through V slowly relax the
restrictions on the remaining listed drugs in proportion to the dangers
associated with the drugs and their societal value.42
34. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 801 (Congressional findings); ROBERT L. BOGOMOLNY ET
AL., A HANDBOOK ON THE 1970 FEDERAL DRUG ACT: SHIFTING THE PERSPECTIVE 5, 63-65
(Springfield, Ill., Charles C. Thomas 1975).
35. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811, 812.
36. See 21 U.S.C. § 812.
37. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11. Foreshadowing the current dilemma, Bogomolny, Sonnen-
reich, and Roccograndi noted in their 1975 commentary to the Act that "[d]espite any moral bias
with regard to marihuana, if it proves successful in treatment, such as in reducing intraoccular eye
pressure glaucoma, then it must be rescheduled to a lower schedule because of its medical use."
BOGOMOLNY, supra note 34, at 74 (emphasis added).
38. 21 U.S.C. § 812.
39. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12.
40. 21 U.S.C. § 812.
41. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12.
42. See 21 U.S.C. § 812; 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.12-1308.15.
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The authority to examine substances and move them between
schedules was given to the Attorney General.43 Before initiating
control proceedings, the Attorney General must also seek medical and
scientific evaluations from the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare.44 The Secretary, in turn, is to make a recommendation as
to the proper disposition of the substance in question, including which
schedule it should be placed in."5  The authority to reschedule
substances was delegated by the Attorney General to the Director of
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (now the Drug
Enforcement Administration).46
The Act had been in effect for scarcely more than a year when the
first petition to reschedule marijuana was filed in 1972. The petition
asked that marijuana be moved from Schedule I to Schedule V.47 The
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) quickly declined
to file the petition, indicating that the 1961 Single Convention
requirements prevented such action. The petitioners appealed to the
D.C. Circuit, which remanded the case. The court found the BNDD's
decision to be inconsistent with the administrative process, which
called for a finding on the merits.48
On remand, hearings were held before Administrative Law Judge
Lewis Parker in 1975. Judge Parker found that the 1961 treaty did
allow for a placement of cannabis or cannabis resin in Schedule II, and
cannabis leaves in Schedule V, and further suggested that the proper
course of action was to hold rescheduling hearings as called for in the
Act.49 Nevertheless, the Acting Administrator of the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) entered a final order denying the petition"in all respects."" ° Again, petitioners appealed, and again the D.C.
Circuit remanded the case. This time, the court of appeals ordered the
DEA to refer the petition to the Secretary of Health, Education and
43. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 811(b).
45. Id.
46. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.100, et. seq. The DEA became the successor to the BNDD in 1973.
See 38 Fed. Reg. 15932 (1973).
47. The petition was filed by the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML) and several other groups. See NORML v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654, 655 (D.C. Cir.
1974); NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d 735, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Since 1987, the efforts of the
major proponents of rescheduling have focused only on a transfer of marijuana to Schedule II.
See In the Matter of Marijuana Rescheduling Petition [Drug Enforcement Administration], No.
86-22, Opinion and Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision
of A.L.J. Francis L. Young at 4 [hereinafter Young Opinion].
48. NORML v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d at 659, 660.
49. NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d at 742.
50. 40 Fed. Reg. 44,164, 44,168 (1975) (citing NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d at 742).
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Welfare (HEW) for an independent scientific evaluation, and to
generally comply with the "rulemaking procedures" of the Act."'
In 1979, when the HEW issued a recommendation that marijuana
remain in Schedule I, the DEA issued a final order denying the
rescheduling petition, again failing to hold hearings on the matter.12
For the third time, the petitioners appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and
for the third time the case was remanded, this time for a full reconsid-
eration of the issues. The court of appeals instructed the DEA to refer
the substances at issue to the Department of Health and Human
Services, successor to the HEW, for a full scientific evaluation and
scheduling recommendation. 3 The parties complied, and in 1986 the
DEA announced that rescheduling hearings would be held before
Administrative Law Judge Francis Young. 4 During the preliminary
stages of the hearings, the rescheduling petition was amended to
restrict the hearings to consideration of placement of marijuana in
Schedule II." The issues before Judge Young were whether marijua-
na had a currently accepted medical use, or currently accepted medical
use with severe restrictions, and whether there was a lack of accepted
safety for use of the marijuana plant under medical supervision.16
Extensive evidentiary hearings were held in San Francisco, New
Orleans, and Washington, D.C., with final oral arguments before
Judge Young in Washington, D.C. in June of 1988." 7 Based on the
evidence before him, Judge Young found that marijuana did not have
an accepted medical use to treat glaucoma, but did have accepted
medical uses for the treatment of multiple sclerosis, spasticity,
hyperarathyroidism, and cancer during chemotherapy. With respect
to cancer treatment, Judge Young concluded the following:
(I]t is clear beyond any question that many people find marijuana
to have, in the words of the Act, an "accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States" in effecting relief for cancer patients.
Oncologists, physicians treating cancer patients, accept this. Other
medical practitioners and researchers accept this. Medical faculty
professors accept it. Nurses performing hands-on patient care
accept it. Patients accept it. 8
51. NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d at 757. Those "rulemaking procedures" are contained in
21 U.S.C. §§ 811 & 812.
52. See Young Opinion at 3. For the final order, see 44 Fed. Reg. 36,123 (1979).
53. See Young Opinion at 3.
54. See id. at 4.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 6.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 26.
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Judge Young also found that there was an accepted safety for use
of marijuana under medical supervision. 9 Overall, Judge Young
recommended that the DEA move marijuana to Schedule I.60
The DEA, however, rejected Judge Young's recommendation,
finding that the phrase "currently accepted medical use" required that
more than a minority, "even a respectable minority," of physicians
accept the usefulness of marijuana. The DEA Administrator devel-
oped and employed an eight-factor test to determine the meaning of"currently accepted medical use" and found that marijuana did not
meet the criteria.61  In particular, he concluded that "[t]he vast
majority of physicians do not accept marijuana as having a medical
use" and that marijuana was "not recognized as medicine in generally
accepted pharmacopoeia, medical references, journals, or textbooks. 62
For a fourth time, petitioners appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and
for the fourth time the case was remanded. This time, the court found
that although the eight-factor test used by the DEA was "in the main
acceptable," it contained several factors that could never be met. In
particular, the test required general use and acceptance of a drug before
it could be removed from Schedule I, even though Schedule I expressly
prevented such use and acceptance. 63
On remand, the DEA discarded the eight-factor test, removed the
elements generally considered impossible to meet, and formulated a
new five-factor test.64 In addition, the new DEA Administrator
59. See Young Opinion at 66.
60. See id. at 67, 68.
61. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 930 F.2d 936, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing
53 Fed. Reg. 5,156 (1988)). The eight factors used by the DEA were (1) scientifically determined
and accepted knowledge of its chemistry, (2) toxicology and pharmacology of the substance in
animals, (3) establishment of its effectiveness in humans through scientifically designed clinical
trials, (4) general availability of the substance and information regarding the substance and its use,
(5) recognition of its clinical use in generally accepted pharmacopoeia, medical references, journals,
or textbooks, (6) specific indications for the treatment of recognized disorders, (7) recognition of
the use of the substance by organizations or associations of physicians, and (8) recognition and
use of the substance by a substantial segment of the medical practitioners in the United States.
Id. Under the Act, "currently accepted medical use" is not defined, but the administrator is
obliged to consider "scientific evidence of [the drug's] pharmacological effect" and the "state of
current scientific knowledge regarding the drug." 21 U.S.C. § 811(c)(2), (3).
62. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, 930 F.2d at 938 (citing 54 Fed. Reg. 53,784).
63. See id. at 937, 941.
64. See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(citing 57 Fed. Reg. 10,506, 10,507 (1992)). The five factor test to determine "currently accepted
medical use" is as follows: (1) the drug's chemistry must be known and reproducible, (2) there
must be adequate safety studies, (3) there must be adequate and well-controlled studies proving
efficacy, (4) the drug must be accepted by qualified experts, and (5) the scientific evidence must
be widely available. Id.
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indicated that his predecessor had not relied on the "impossible"
factors in his earlier analysis. Under the new test, the Administrator
issued a final order denying the rescheduling petition. 6' For a fifth
and final time the petitioners appealed, objecting to the variations in
the evidentiary standard and the alleged bias of the DEA. The court
of appeals found, however, that the petitioners had not been prejudiced
by the evidentiary standard, and that the Administrator's findings were
supported by "substantial evidence. ' 66 On February 18, 1994, the
petition for review was denied, bringing to an end twenty-two years of
marijuana rescheduling litigation in the federal courts.67
C. Medical Use of Marijuana Today
At least a "respectable minority" of the modern medical commu-
nity believes that marijuana has legitimate medicinal value for cancer
patients suffering nausea from chemotherapy. In fact, when a random
sample of the American Society of Clinical Oncology was questioned
about the value of marijuana, more than 1,000 oncologists responded,
and forty-four percent reported they had suggested marijuana use to at
least one of their patients.68 More recently, the editor of the New
England Journal of Medicine attacked the federal policy on marijuana,
arguing that "[the advanced stages of many illnesses and their
treatments are often accompanied by intractable nausea, vomiting, or
pain. Thousands of patients with cancer, AIDS, and other diseases
report they have obtained striking relief from these devastating
symptoms by smoking marijuana. ' 69 Similarly, after a meeting in
February of 1997, a National Institute of Health panel recommended
further research on marijuana relating to chemotherapy nausea, wasting
due to AIDS, glaucoma, and neuropathic pain.7°
On the other hand, significant members of the medical communi-
ty are opposed to the medical use of marijuana. One objection is that
leaf marijuana contains over four hundred chemicals, increasing to over
two thousand when smoked, and many of these chemicals cannot be
identified. This prevents a "precise chemical quantification" of
65. See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, 15 F.3d at 1134 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 10,499).
66. Id. at 1137.
67. See id. at 1136, 1137.
68. Doblin RE and Kleiman MA, Marijuana as Antiemetic Medicine: A Survey of
Oncologists' Experiences and Attitudes, J. CLIN. ONCOLOGY (1991).
69. Jerome P. Kassirer, M.D., Federal Foolishness and Marijuana, 5 NEW. ENG. J. MED.
366 (1997) [hereinafter Federal Foolishness].
70. W.E. Leary, U.S. Panel Urges Study of Medical Marijuana, NEW YORK TIMEs,
February 21, 1997, at A27.
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marijuana, and causes problems when attempting to isolate a standard-
ized dosage." Additionally, physicians opposed to marijuana use cite
to the availability of alternative remedies such as Ondansetron and
Marinol, or synthetic THC. 2 The American Medical Association,
the American Cancer Society, the National Multiple Sclerosis Society,
and the American Glaucoma Society also oppose medicinal use of
marijuana.73
This division is also reflected politically: voters in some states
have approved medicinal marijuana initiatives, while some have not.14
Even so, the viability of the state initiative process as a conduit for
reform of medicinal marijuana restrictions is in question at this time.
After successful initiatives in California and Arizona, the federal
government has reminded doctors that federal law still applies and that
physicians who prescribe marijuana may lose their licenses and their
right to federal funds, as well as face criminal prosecution.7"
Thus the question is, given this current climate, the history of
rescheduling efforts under the Controlled Substances Act, and the
history of medicinal marijuana use in the United States, can the federal
government constitutionally keep marijuana in Schedule I? Given the
circumstances of people like William Cohen, the answer is no.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MARIJUANA IN SCHEDULE I:
THE WRONG RIGHTS
The success of a constitutional argument against the placement of
marijuana in Schedule I is premised on what is defined as the relevant
right. Numerous attempts have been made to attack the constitutional-
ity of this statutory provision. They have included religious rights
under the First Amendment, cruel and unusual punishment attacks
under the Eighth Amendment, and due process or equal protection
71. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 788, 940 P.2d at 616.
72. See Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 789, 940 P.2d at 617. In 1984, a study published in the
Proceedings of the American Society of Clinical Oncology suggested that smoked marijuana
provided no more relief from nausea than synthetic THC, the active ingredient in marijuana. 132
Wash. 2d at 790, 940 P.2d at 618, n.14. See also Gabriel G. Nahas et al., Marijuana Is the
Wrong Medicine, WALL ST. J., March 11, 1997, at A22 (denouncing the New England Journal
of Medicine's stance on the issue).
73. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 788, 940 P.2d at 616.
74. See generally Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West 1997) (codifying California's
Prop. 215, approved by the voters November 5, 1996); 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws 124 §§ 3-5; 246 § 3
(codifying Arizona's Prop. 200, approved by the voters November 5, 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3412.01 (West 1997) (version as modified by Arizona legislature); Hunter T. George,
Voters Reject Broad Drug Initiative, Associated Press Pol. Serv., Nov. 5, 1997, available in 1997
WL 2560691 (describing rejection of Proposition 685 by Washington voters).
75. See White House Briefing, supra note 4.
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challenges based on the right to possess marijuana in one's own home.
All of these attacks, with some narrow exceptions, have been unsuc-
cessful. This section will summarize these various attempts and
explain why they have been rejected. It will demonstrate that these
challenges ask courts to address issues that are too broad and would
have results that cannot be justified without legislative action. It will
conclude that these types of challenges are not necessary when the
issue is medical use of marijuana by seriously ill individuals. In other
words, when the constitutional issue at stake is medicinal use of
marijuana, the protections claimed below are the wrong rights.
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
At the time the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 was passed by Congress, many states had
legislation on the books that treated marijuana as a narcotic or
hallucinogen and provided for exceptional sentences upon conviction
for possession, sale, or distribution.76 Thus, in Missouri, one could
be sentenced to death for selling marijuana to a minor, and simple
possession in Colorado could lead to a sentence of fifteen years.77
These sentences lead to attacks on the statutes based on the Eighth
Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.
The most famous of these cases reached the Supreme Court of
Michigan in 1972. Radical poet John Sinclair had been arrested for
possession of two marijuana cigarettes, and he faced a minimum
sentence under Michigan law of over nine years in prison.7 ' The
conviction was overturned for a variety of reasons, with four judges
submitting extensive opinions. Justice Brennan, writing to vacate the
sentence, held that the minimum term imposed by the statute was
"demonstrably and grossly excessive" given the nature of the offense
and the disposition of other similar offenses. 79 The Sinclair opinion
reflected an attitude in the early 1970s that when marijuana was not
distinguished from narcotics or other harder drugs, the resulting
sentences were inappropriate and unconstitutional. 80
76. See Hyman M. Greenstein and Paul E. Dibianco, Marijuana Laws-A Crime Against
Humanity, 48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 314 (1972).
77. See id.
78. See Michigan v. Sinclair, 194 N.W.2d 878, 879 (Mich. 1972). Sinclair was arrested in
1967, and charged with unlawful possession under Michigan law.
79. Id. at 906. Justice Adams concurred in that opinion.
80. Some of these decisions viewed the sentence schemes as an equal protection problem.
See, e.g., Sinclair, 194 N.W.2d at 887 (Swainson, J.); People v. McCabe, 275 N.W.2d 497 (Ill.
1971).
[Vol. 22:235
1998] Medicinal Marijuana 249
Nevertheless, the attack on marijuana scheduling through the
sentencing provisions has essentially been foreclosed because marijuana
is no longer classified as a narcotic, possession sentences have been
greatly reduced, and most simple possession charges result in misde-
meanor and not felony dispositions.81 States have generally eliminated
marijuana sentences that truly shock the conscience.82 In addition,
federal sentencing provisions are generally lenient. They allow for civil
dispositions and limited, if any, jail time, especially for first offend-
ers.8" Therefore, whatever one's view of the effectiveness of current
marijuana sentences, it is doubtful they would be considered "extreme
examples that no rational person, in no time or place, could accept. ' 84
B. Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Religion
Another avenue of constitutional attack on marijuana scheduling
laws has been the First Amendment, and in particular the claim that
marijuana use is part of a religious exercise. The federal courts,
however, have been relatively clear that no broad religious exception
from marijuana laws is constitutionally required.8" The passage of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act could have provided some
constitutional protection to Rastafarians or others who use marijuana
as part of an established religious practice.86 Since the Act has been
found unconstitutional, however, the issue has been rendered moot.87
Even had the Act survived, it would have provided little consolation
to those who do not smoke marijuana as part of a religious practice.
Since William Cohen wishes to use marijuana for medical, and not
81. See, e.g., Marcoux v. Attorney General, 375 N.E.2d 688, 693 (Mass. 1978) (upholding
marijuana statute and noting reduction of marijuana possession sentences); Illinois NORML, Inc.
v. Scott, 383 N.E.2d 1330, 1335 (I11. 1978). For a summary of cruel and unusual punishment
challenges, see 96 A.L.R.3d 225 § 8 (1980).
82. The Missouri law that once allowed for the death penalty for sale of marijuana to a
minor now makes the same crime a class B felony, punishable by a maximum of fifteen years in
prison. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 195.212, 558.011 (West 1997).
83. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1997). This provision provides relatively lenient sentencing
options for simple possession of marijuana and other substances, especially in the case of first
offenders, who may receive a maximum of one year's imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. The
sentencing guidelines also distinguish between marijuana and other substances such as cocaine,
where a minimum five-year prison term is imposed. See id. Finally, a 1988 addition to the Act
allows for a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 in cases where the amount possessed is deemed
to be for "personal use" under regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. See id.
84. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1018 (1991) (rejecting Eighth Amendment
proportionality review of drug sentence).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 892 F.2d 453, 456-457 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing
numerous federal cases to support this conclusion).
86. See United States v. Bauer, 75 F.3d 1366, 1376 (9th Cir. 1995).
87. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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religious purposes, neither the Act nor the First Amendment are
applicable.88
C. Equal Protection
Numerous equal protection challenges have been advanced on the
theory that marijuana possession statutes impose penalties not imposed
upon users of alcohol, tobacco, and other substances.89 Almost
unanimously, state and federal courts have rejected this argument on
the grounds that legislatures may engage in so-called piecemeal
lawmaking: "Whatever the harmful effects of alcohol and tobacco ....
Congress is not required to attempt to eradicate all similar evils."9
Federal courts, in particular, have applied rational basis review and
have declined to act as a "superlegislature" in evaluating policy choices
between the regulation of marijuana, alcohol, and tobacco, emphasizing
that these issues to do not invoke "fundamental rights."91 The same
can be said of continuing attempts to invoke the Due Process Clause
as a protection to possess and use marijuana in one's own home.
D. Due Process Privacy Right to Possess Marijuana in the Home
The concept that one's home is a castle, as related to the private
use of controlled substances, dates back more than a century. The
earliest cases addressing the issue dealt with the right to possess and
consume liquor in the home.92 The cases that found statutes prevent-
ing private liquor possession unconstitutional relied on the philosophi-
cal underpinnings of William Blackstone, John Stuart Mill, and the
common law maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.93 The
well-known Latin phrase, normally applied to property rights, reflected
the idea that one who consumed liquor in his own home injured
nobody but himself, and thus could not be subjected to the controls of
88. For other marijuana cases rejecting First Amendment claims, see 96 A.L.R.3d 225 § 7
(1980). Although there is no First Amendment right to use marijuana for medical purposes, there
is almost certainly a right to publicly advocate its use for such purposes. See, e.g., State v. Marsh,
1997 WL 633000 (Wash. App. Div. 1) (1997) (unpublished opinion).
89. See generally United States v. Fry, 787 F.2d 903, 905 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 512 (Alaska 1975);
State v. Kells, 259 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Neb. 1977); Illinois NORML, 383 N.E.2d at 1336. Cf. State
v. Leigh, 46 U.S.L.W. 2425 (CC Fla. 1978).
90. Fry, 787 F.2d at 905.
91. Greene, 892 F.2d at 455, 456.
92. See generally State v. Gilman, 10 S.E. 283 (W.Va. 1889); Commonwealth v. Campbell,
117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909).
93. See Gilman, 10 S.E. at 284; Campbell, 117 S.W. at 385-87. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas: "one should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
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the state. Similarly, Mill's essay On Liberty suggested severe limita-
tions on the exercise of a state's police power in the name of the
natural rights of individuals.94
Indeed, Mill's ideas have been influential enough to survive into
modern case law. In Sinclair, for example, one of the justices voting
to overturn the marijuana statute suggested that the Due Process
Clause itself incorporated Mill's ideas and thus prohibited legislation
against private marijuana possession." While not going this far, the
Supreme Court of Alaska recognized that the right to privacy protects
the possession and use of marijuana in the home in Ravin v. State.9 6
These cases, however, by far represent the minority opinion in current
privacy jurisprudence.
For one, these cases are severely limited in their precedential
value. The earliest cases hail from an era when the courts regularly
invalidated statutes under now discredited substantive due process
analysis. 97 The Sinclair opinion represents the writing of one judge
on a fragmented court, and relies on no citation at all to legal
authority.98 And the Ravin case has not only been sharply restricted
in its application, but arguably was based primarily on the Alaska
Constitution, and not on federal rights.99 Thus, when other plaintiffs
have attempted to apply the reasoning of Ravin, they have consistently
been denied relief.1"' The reason why is that the courts, under a
modern substantive due process analysis, have determined that there
is no fundamental right to smoke marijuana, even in the home.'
94. [T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of the community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do
or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because, in the opinions of others to do so would be wise, or even right.
Campbell, 117 S.W. at 386 (citing On Liberty, 22-23).
95. See Sinclair, 194 N.W.2d at 896 (Kavanagh, J.). Justice Kavanagh cites the same
passage from Mill that the Campbell court relied upon. He then continues, "[a]lthough it is
conceivable that some legitimate public interest might warrant state interference with what an
individual consumes, 'Big Brother' cannot, in the name of Public health, dictate to anyone what
he can eat or drink or smoke in the Privacy of his own home." Id.
96. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511.
97. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
98. See Sinclair, 194 N.W.2d at 896 (Kavanagh, J.).
99. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 500 (conducting state constitutional analysis to reach conclusion
on privacy right). See also Marcoux, 375 N.E.2d at 691 (rejecting Ravin in part because the
decision rested on art. 1, § 22 of the Alaska constitution); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 12
(Alaska 1978) (declining to apply Ravin to cocaine).
100. See, e.g., Marcoux, 375 N.E.2d at 691; Kells, 259 N.W.2d at 23.
101. See generally Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 784, 940 P.2d at 612; Marcoux, 375 N.E.2d at
690-91; Kells, 259 N.W.2d at 23; Greene, 892 F.2d at 456; Fry, 787 F.2d at 905.
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This, in turn, subjects marijuana statutes challenged on this ground to
rational basis review, a standard that is very easy to satisfy. Hardly
anyone can argue that laws preventing the use of marijuana do not
have at least some rational connection to some legitimate state interest,
particularly relating to the protection of the public health, safety, and
morals. 102
Of course, many of these cases are distinguishable from the case
of William Cohen in the sense that most did not deal with medical
use, but merely with the criminalization of simple possession. Notably
though, the Supreme Court of Washington recently applied the
"fundamental right to smoke marijuana" analysis as part of its premise
to reject a claim made by a terminally ill cancer patient."0 3 This
suggests that the standard possession privacy approach will not be
successful no matter whom the plaintiff is. Thus, in order to avoid
rational basis review, a constitutional challenge to the placement of
marijuana in Schedule I must be based on different rights: rights that
the courts will, or already have, considered fundamental. Only these
rights can justify the Court's engagement in a more heightened
scrutiny of the legislation at issue.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MARIJUANA IN SCHEDULE I:
THE RIGHT RIGHT
A substantive due process claim under current doctrine, in order
to succeed, all but requires that the right asserted implicate a funda-
mental liberty. Only then will the Court depart from rational basis
analysis and engage in a careful balancing of liberty and authority.0 4
How one determines whether a right is fundamental is unclear
given the most recent decisions of the Court. One definition limits
fundamental rights to those "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."'0 5 An alternate approach would find a fundamental right
abridged when "a statute sets up one of those 'arbitrary impositions'
or 'purposeless restraints' at odds with the Due Process Clause of the
102. A common rational basis argument, for example, is the state's interest in keeping the
roadways safe from drivers under the influence of marijuana. See, e.g., Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511.
Furthermore, under the deference that rational basis review affords to the legislature, as long as
there are conflicting opinions about the medical value of marijuana, the legislature's judgment is
likely to stand. See Fry, 787 F.2d at 905.
103. See Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 784, 940 P.2d at 612.
104. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2281-83 (1997); Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
105. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)
("so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental")).
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Fourteenth Amendment."' 6  The second test, most recently ad-
vanced by Justice Souter in Washington v. Glucksberg, has the
advantage of avoiding "the absolutist failing of many older cases
without embracing the opposite pole of equating reasonableness with
past practice described at a very specific level."'0 7 Whichever test is
employed, though, the right asserted by William Cohen should be
considered fundamental if it is narrowly defined. The narrower the
asserted liberty interest, the easier it will be for the Court to recognize
it; the broader the interest, the more stark the implications will be.
For example, a broad right to smoke marijuana would mean that
not only possession, but also sale and distribution of marijuana would
be protected. Similarly, marijuana use could not be restricted to those
with a medical need. Such a right would not qualify as fundamental
under either of the above tests. If, however, the asserted interest is a
narrow right of the seriously ill to consult with a physician in a manner
necessary to control severe pain, the right should receive heightened
protection under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.' In fact, there is substantial authority to suggest that
such a fundamental right already has been recognized, that it is rooted
in this Nation's history, and that to abridge it would indeed enact an
arbitrary and purposeless restraint. This fundamental right should be
applied to the medicinal use of marijuana and properly balanced
against competing state interests.
A. The Fundamental Liberty Interest
There are longstanding fundamental rights to both bodily integrity
and consultation with a physician. The genesis of these rights is
generally traced back to the Common Law.'0 9 Blackstone recognized
a right to "personal security" which included "a person's legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and
his reputation.""'  Protection extended to "[t]he preservation of a
106. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992). Presumably this test would apply to the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment if the challenged legislation were federal, and not state.
107. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2281.
108. This analysis, like much modern substantive due process analysis, could also apply to
an equal protection challenge to the statute, "but that source of law does essentially nothing in
a case like this that the Due Process Clause cannot do on its own." Id. at 2277, n.3.
109. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2288 (Souter, J., concurring) (linking right of bodily
integrity to common law of battery).
110. William Blackstone, Of the Rights of Persons, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 125 (Univ. of Chicago Press ed. 1979) (1765).
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man's health from such practices as may prejudice or annoy it.
... An oft-quoted early modern statement of this right comes
from Justice Cardozo who, while on the New York Court of Appeals,
opined that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body .
The Supreme Court has applied variations of this right to many
different factual situations, affording due process protection to
procreation, contraception, child bearing, abortion, and most notably,
the hastening of death by refusal of medical treatment."' This last
application, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, has also
been interpreted as a right of "freedom from state-inflicted pain." '114
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court declined to
extend a right of bodily integrity to allow terminally ill, mentally
competent patients access to physician assisted suicide."' Neverthe-
less, a majority of the Justices in that case based their opinions on the
fact that the patients in question were not being denied relief from
pain. Justice Stevens, for example, suggested that plaintiffs had a
strong liberty interest in avoiding suffering:
[N]ot only were they terminally ill, they were suffering constant and
severe pain. Avoiding intolerable pain and the indignity of living
one's final days incapacitated and in agony is certainly "[a]t the
heart of [the] liberty . . . to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.""' 6
Likewise, Justice Souter, in addressing one of the State's argu-
ments against a right to die, noted that unlike the circumstances in
cases of assisted suicide, "the importance of pain relief is so clear that
there is less likelihood that relieving pain would run counter to what
111. Id. at 130. This portion of Blackstone's work has been recognized by American Courts
and cited approvingly. See, e.g., Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 247 F. 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1917).
112. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). For an
early recognition of the right by the Supreme Court, see Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891): "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference with others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law." Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251.
113. See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (child
rearing); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (refusal of medical treatment to hasten death).
114. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261).
115. See id. at 2259.
116. Id. at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).
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a responsible patient would choose ... .""' Finally, Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg and O'Connor did not even address the asserted due process
right to avoid suffering, because they assumed that the patients had
access to palliative care. 118
In the case of William Cohen, the right asserted raises implica-
tions similar to the right in Glucksberg. Mr. Cohen is terminally ill
and in grave pain. In the name of personal bodily integrity, he seeks
protection of his right to the counsel of a physician to help him end
that pain. But unlike the assisted suicide cases where the availability
of palliative care is assumed, this case is about the denial of palliative
care. In that sense, it is like Cruzan, in which the patient was found
to have a right to be free of state inflicted pain." 9 Because it in-
volves state interference with medical judgment, it is also like Roe,
where the Court determined that decisions on abortion in the first
trimester of pregnancy were medical in nature and should be left to the
mother's physician. 2 °
Under the preceding jurisprudence, Mr. Cohen's liberty interest
in consulting with his physician and avoiding pain and suffering is
fundamental and must therefore be balanced with the interests of the
State.
B. Balancing the State Interests
After determining that a person has a valid fundamental liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause, the next step is to balance that
interest against the relevant state interests.' 2'
Significantly, there are no state interests involved in this case
reaching the magnitude of certain earlier substantive due process cases.
For example, the State does not have an interest in protecting fetal life,
as in the abortion cases.' 22 The State also does not have an interest
in protecting people who may be mentally incompetent from making
117. Id. at 2291 n.16 (Souter, J., concurring).
118. See id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2310 (Ginsburg, J., concurring for the
reasons given by Justice O'Connor), 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer stated "were
state law to prevent the provision of palliative care, including the administration of drugs as
needed to avoid pain at the end of life-then the law's impact upon serious and otherwise
unavoidable physical pain would be more directly at issue." Id. at 2312.
119. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2305 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
269).
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
121. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
122. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162; Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. Note that the case of William
Cohen, quite obviously, also does not implicate the other state interest laid out in the abortion
cases: protecting the health of pregnant mothers.
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significant decisions about life and death. This interest was at issue
both in Cruzan and Glucksberg, which involved physician-assisted
suicide and the termination of life support, and played an important
role in the Court's decisions. 123  Without these interests, the State
must rely on traditional interests in preventing the proliferation of
dangerous drug usage and preserving the health and morals of society.
Since the nineteenth century, however, courts have been aware
that these types of state interests may only reach so far. For example,
in 1890, the Supreme Court of Washington, in a 3-2 decision, found
that a territorial opium law did not violate the Constitution. 124
Justice Scott assailed the law as overbroad in his dissent, however,
because it did not distinguish between recreational and medicinal usage
of opium:
I make no question but that the habit of smoking opium may be
repulsive and degrading. That its effect would be to shatter the
nerves and destroy the intellect; and that it may tend to the increase
of pauperism and crime. But there is a vast difference between the
commission of a single act, and a confirmed habit. There is a
distinction to be recognized between the use and abuse of any article
or substance. It is also well known that opium, in its different
forms, is frequently administered as a medicine with beneficial
results; and while it may not be customary to administer it by way
of inhalation, yet the legislature should not arbitrarily prevent its use
in such a manner. 125
This opinion recognizes that while drug use may be insidious, the
mere fact that a statute is designed to prevent abuse of controlled
substances does not make it constitutional. Thus, in analyzing the
State's asserted interests in the context of drug use prevention, two
important points should be considered. First, those interests pertaining
strictly to the recreational use of marijuana should be separated from
those that potentially apply to medicinal use. And second, these
interests should be examined in light of the possibility that they could
be accomplished if marijuana were placed in Schedule 11.126
123. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279; Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2272.
124. See Territory v. Ah Lim, 1 Wash. 156 (1890).
125. Id. at 174-75 (Scott, J., dissenting). Justice Stiles concurred with Justice Scott. See also
In re Ah Jow, 29 F. 181 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886) (releasing convict on petition for habeus corpus due
to overbreadth of opium statute).
126. For example, in a footnote in Seeley, the Supreme Court of Washington cites numerous
cases in support of the premise that marijuana's classification does not violate due process. The
cases cited involving marijuana, however, do not deal with medical use of marijuana, but use in
general. See Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 791, 940 P.2d at 619 n.20 (citing Fry, 787 F.2d at 903; Bell,
488 F. Supp. at 134 n.29; State v. Dickamore, 22 Wash. App. 851, 592 P.2d 681 (1979)). Thus,
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The State has advanced numerous interests in support of keeping
marijuana in Schedule I. They include the lack of comprehensive
knowledge about marijuana's effects, the conflict in the medical
community about its viability as a medicine, the public health risk
associated with high contents of carcinogens and other unknown
substances, and the potential of marijuana to act as a "gateway" to
other drugs and send the wrong message to society.'27
Since recreational use is not an issue in this case, certain of these
interests are at best only marginally applicable. Quite obviously, for
example, the presence of carcinogens and other harmful substances is
not relevant to a plaintiff who is already dying of cancer, or in the
advanced stages of multiple sclerosis.
Nor does the argument that marijuana is a "gateway" drug that
will send the wrong message to society make any sense in the context
of medicinal use. This position is completely debunked by a recent
article in the New England Journal of Medicine." 8 Addressing the
improper message argument, the Journal cites to Boston Globe
columnist Ellen Goodman, who asked "What is the infamous signal
being sent to [children]? .. .If you hurry up and get cancer, you, too,
can get high?" '129  Responding to the "gateway" argument, the
Journal cited a 1994 study finding that 83 percent of then current
marijuana users never try cocaine."13
And while the above study also tells us that 17 percent of
marijuana users have tried harder drugs, this is at best an argument
against blanket legalization. Like the other state interests noted above,
the "gateway" problem will become no more severe if marijuana is
placed in Schedule II. It is hard to imagine that the placement of
cocaine, opiates, morphine, amphetamines, barbiturates, and PCP in
Schedule II is also sending a message to children to use these drugs.
Just as ridiculous is the suggestion that the placement of these drugs
in Schedule II opens the door to experiment with them as a stepping
stone to harder Schedule I substances such as LSD or heroin. Many
Schedule II drugs are equally, if not more, dangerous than marijuana.
they are based on rational basis review of the wrong rights, and not applicable.
127. For advancements of these state interests, see generally Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 790,
940 P.2d at 618; NORML v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123, 136, 139 (D.D.C. 1980); Kells, 259 N.W.2d
at 22-24.
128. See George J. Annas, Reefer Madness-The Federal Response to California's Medical-
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The State may also assert that since THC, the active ingredient
in marijuana, is available in synthetic form, this should allow more
comprehensive regulation of smoked marijuana. There are several
problems with this assertion. First, as noted before, synthetic THC,
or Marinol, has several side-effects not associated with smaller doses
of smoked marijuana. For example, one Marinol dose may render a
patient virtually unconscious for extended periods of time. In addition,
patients wishing to take smoked marijuana to avoid the nausea
associated with chemotherapy may not be able to swallow doses of
Marinol. 3' Second, even if patients are able to take Marinol, and
obtain the same results as smoked marijuana, Marinol may not be
available to them.132
Finally, unlike other controversial drugs such as laetrile, marijuana
is not being advanced as a cure for any of the diseases in question, but
merely as a painkiller.133  Thus the question as to its effectiveness is
best left to the patient in consultation with his physician.' 34 If the
State, as well as at least a respected minority of the medical communi-
ty, can acknowledge that marijuana gives a dying man comfort, it is
131. See Brief of Respondent at 2-6, Seeley (No. 63534-0); Federal Foolishness, supra note
69 (discussing difficulty in properly titrating doses of synthetic THC).
132. Consider the case of Todd McCormick, a longtime bone cancer patient and marijuana
user arrested in California for the cultivation of 4,000 marijuana plants at a Bel Air mansion.
When U.S. Magistrate James McMahon thought that McCormick, who was awaiting trial, was
using his Marinol treatments to mask the continued use of smoked marijuana, McMahon ordered
McCormick to stop using Marinol as well. McCormick was eventually jailed after he continued
to test positive for chemical marijuana. U.S. District Judge George H. King overruled
McMahon's order jailing McCormick, but maintained the Marinol prohibition. At the time of
this writing, McCormick's trial is pending in United States District Court in California. See Matt
Krasnowski, 'Pot Prince' Jailed After Positive Tests: Tearful McCormick Insists He Has Obeyed the
Judge, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, April 4, 1998 at A18; Linda Deutsch, Marijuana Activist
Freed Pending Court Hearing, Associated Press (April 15, 1998).
133. The Seeley court, for example, also relied on some of the laetrile cases of the 1970s to
conclude that there is no due process right to ingest marijuana to relieve severe pain. See Seeley,
132 Wash. 2d at 791, 940 P.2d at 619, n.20. But laetrile was advanced by doctors as a cure for
cancer and a substitute for other forms of treatment. Patients were even encouraged in some
instances to discontinue more traditional treatment, even if such treatment might be effective for
them, and to begin taking laetrile. See, e.g., People v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 923-25 (Cal.
1979). Accordingly, the "legitimate state interest" advanced in the laetrile cases was "the effective
diagnosis, care, treatment, or cure of persons suffering from cancer .... " Id. at 923. No such
interest can be advanced to prevent the use of marijuana as a painkiller, since such use in no way
interferes with the diagnosis or treatment of illnesses. See also United States v. Rutherford, 442
U.S. 544 (1979).
134. See, e.g., Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 795, 940 P.2d at 623 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (noting
that the State "cannot dispute Mr. Seeley's beliefs about marijuana and how it affects him...");
Privitera, 591 P.2d at 924 ("What can 'effective' mean if the person, by all prevailing standards
... is going to die of cancer regardless of what may be done").
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hard to see how the State can also assert that marijuana has "no
currently accepted medical use."' 35
Ultimately, these arguments do not mean that the State must take
the most sensible path simply because there is a conflict in authority.
But recalling the substantive due process test as including a "freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,"
the State must advance a more compelling interest to keep marijuana
in Schedule I, rather than Schedule II, at the expense of suffering and
seriously ill individuals.'36 While the legislature may seem to be the
ideal place to come to this conclusion, there are significant reasons to
believe that the responsibility must lie with the Court.
V. POLICIES SUPPORTING JUDICIAL REVIEW
If we balance the individual and state interests elaborated above,
it becomes clear that the individual right is more compelling. The
question then becomes whether the Court, as opposed to state or
federal legislatures, is the best place for William Cohen to seek
protection of this right. As will be shown below, however, both state
and federal political systems are not effective forums to address this
issue. First, federal enforcement of the Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act places a chokehold on the states' freedom to legislate their
own solutions to the medicinal marijuana problem. Second, the plight
of terminally ill patients seeking marijuana is unlikely to be addressed
by the federal political process because of the continuing stigma
attached to marijuana users and physicians willing to prescribe
marijuana. This leaves the Court as the only viable option for William
Cohen and those in similar circumstances.
A. Stymieing the States
Recently a headline in USA Today proclaimed: "Medical
Marijuana: Legal, but how long?"' 37  This accurately reflects the
shadow hanging over state legislatures that would deal with the medical
marijuana problem themselves, or even grassroots campaigners at a
state level seeking to win the passage of a popular initiative.
Of course, under the principles of federalism, the states should be
laboratories for "social and economic experiments."' 38  A corollary
of this idea is that citizens opposed to certain controversial policy
135. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B).
136. Casey, 505 U.S. at 848 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)).
137. See Ritter, supra note 4, at IA.
138. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311, (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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choices will "vote with their feet" by locating in a state providing the
package they most prefer.139 This state flexibility invariably reduces
the need for the Court to engage in substantive due process) 40
This was readily apparent from Justice Souter's opinion in
Glucksberg. Recognizing the factual disagreement over the feasibility
of governmental regulation of assisted suicide, Justice Souter noted that
the best precedent available for comparison was the Dutch experience,
which he found inadequate for judicial evaluation. Citing to the
superior ability of the legislature to evaluate the wisdom of such social
policies, Justice Souter then went on to suggest that "[t]here is, indeed,
good reason to suppose that in the absence of a judgment for the
respondents here, just such experimentation will be attempted in some
of the States."'' 41
As shown above, however, there is no reason to believe that any
such experimentation will be allowed in the context of medicinal
marijuana use. The federal government has made it clear that despite
the passage of popular initiatives in Arizona and California, federal
marijuana laws will still be enforced against those who use or distribute
marijuana for medical purposes.'42  Several bills have also been
introduced in Congress to allow for sanctions against physicians who
prescribe medicinal marijuana. 43  In sum, this effectively prevents
states such as California and Arizona from attempting to develop
workable regulation schemes that would allow applicable patients to
use marijuana while at the same time adequately protecting the
legitimate State interests at stake.1 44 The prospect of state solutions,
139. See, e.g., Prichard, Securing the Canadian Economic Union: Federalism and Internal
Barriers to Trade, Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union, 6, 17-18 (1983).
140. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring).
141. Id. (citing ORE. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.800 (Supp. 1996)). Justice Souter was, of
course, referring to the adoption of Oregon's assisted suicide initiative.
142. See, e.g., White House Briefing, supra note 4.
143. See generally S. 3, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 40, 105th Cong. (1997).
144. In reality, the authority of the states to enact legislation that places marijuana in
Schedule I may be even more limited than the authority of Congress. For more than a century,
the courts have placed substantive restrictions on the exercise of state police power regulations.
The police power extends generally to the health, safety, and morals of the public. The interests
of society as a whole must justify the regulation, however, and the means must be reasonably
necessary to accomplish the end "and not unduly oppressive on individuals." Lawton v. Steele,
152 U.S. 133, 136, 137 (1894). This is considered the classic statement of the restraints on the
police power, and is still frequently cited. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962). It has also been applied to the issue of laws preventing marijuana use. See generally
Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 797, 940 P.2d at 625 (Sanders, J., dissenting); State v. Baker, 535 P.2d
1394, 1406 (Haw. 1975) (Kobayashi, J., dissenting); State v. Mallan, 950 P.2d 178, 192 (Haw.
1998) (Levinson, J., dissenting). Whether state marijuana laws satisfy this standard is beyond the
scope of this Comment. Even if, however, the Court were to find current federal marijuana
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through the legislature or by initiative, becomes nothing more than a
paper tiger.
B. Failures of the Federal Political Process
When refusing to invalidate the placement of marijuana in
Schedule I on constitutional grounds, courts have reminded litigants
that the judiciary does not sit as a "superlegislature," and will not
reconcile conflicting policy choices.14  In essence, courts have
deferred to the legislature's determinations on the placement of
marijuana. This deference is improper in the context of the present
case. First, as noted above, the Court should be engaging in height-
ened scrutiny. William Cohen asserts a right that is fundamental and
must therefore be more carefully balanced against the State's interests.
Courts deferring to the legislature have engaged in rational basis review
of the right to smoke marijuana, and not the more searching analysis
based on legislation implicating the right to palliative care and pain
relief. 46 Second, judicial review is appropriate because the federal
political mechanisms designed to address grievances of this nature are
ineffective when medicinal marijuana is involved.
This premise has been borne out already by the manner in which
petitions for the rescheduling of marijuana have been approached by
the DEA. One major goal of the 1970 Act was to allow for flexibility
in the drug schedules and modifications when they proved neces-
sary.14 7 Specific statutory criteria are designed to govern this pro-
cess.148 Yet these seven criteria were not cited when the DEA, under
the authority of the Attorney General, repeatedly denied petitions to
reschedule marijuana. In fact, DEA administrators twice created their
own lists of factors to determine the meaning of the phrase "currently
accepted medical use." '149 These factors were not found anywhere in
the statute, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals determined that at
least one of the lists contained factors that were impossible to
meet."' These factors were utilized by the DEA to reject the
findings of its own administrative law judge, who conducted extensive
evidentiary hearings and suggested that marijuana be moved to
restrictions unconstitutional, this would not stop the states from adopting their own variations.
145. See, e.g., Fry, 787 F.2d at 905; Greene, 892 F.2d at 455; Bell, 488 F. Supp. at 142.
146. See Fry, 787 F.2d at 905; Greene, 892 F.2d at 455-56; Bell, 488 F. Supp. at 138.
147. See 21 U.S.C. § 801.
148. 21 U.S.C. § 811(c).
149. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, 930 F.2d at 938; 15 F.3d at 1135.
150. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, 930 F.2d at 941.
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Schedule II.15 Indeed, granting authority to the DEA to determine
whether marijuana should be rescheduled is like letting the fox guard
the henhouse.
In addition, the political process is inadequate to address the
rights at issue in this case because of the stigma attached to the use of
marijuana. As Justice Stone noted in his famous Carolene Products
footnote, when legislation negatively impacts upon the political process
that could be expected to bring about its repeal, it may be subject to"more exacting judicial scrutiny. . .1.52 The social consequences of
promoting marijuana rescheduling are such that this prospect should
be given serious consideration here.
For example, physicians groups might wield enough political
influence to lobby for a change in federal marijuana policy. Faced,
however, with threats of criminal prosecution, as well as threats to their
licenses and reputations, they may decline to exercise this power." 3
Even grassroots campaigners will feel similar pressures.
For example, a Washington man recently convicted of marijuana
possession was sentenced to a community placement program that
prevented him from advocating the medicinal use of marijuana. The
state court of appeals reversed the sentence as a violation of the First
Amendment.5 4  Nevertheless, the case demonstrates the strong
connection between medicinal marijuana use and criminal conduct, and
shows why many who would advocate medicinal use of marijuana may
be unwilling, or even unable, to do so.
None of these arguments suggest that, under ideal circumstances,
the Court is the superior branch of government to address these types
of questions. But, "[s]ometimes a court may be bound to act
regardless of the institutional preferability of the political branches as
forums for addressing constitutional claims."' 55  Given the political
climate that has surrounded the use of marijuana since the early
151. See Young Opinion, supra note 47, at 67; Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, 930 F.2d
at 938.
152. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
153. See generally White House Briefing, supra note 4; WHO's Marijuana Report Squelched,
Magazine Says, Boston Globe, February 19, 1998, at A2 (discussing possible suppression of report
by the World Health Organization finding that cannabis is safer than alcohol or tobacco, for fear
it would "give ammunition" to the campaign to legalize marijuana); 143 Cong. Rec. E629-02
(Thursday, April 10, 1997) (Statement of Representative Solomon) (announcing introduction of
the Medical Marijuana Prevention Act, which would require the DEA to revoke the federal
license of a physician who recommends smoked marijuana for medical treatment).
154. See State v. Marsh, 1997 WL 633000 (Wash. App. Div. 1) (1997) (unpublished
opinion).
155. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2293 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
[Vol. 22:235
Medicinal Marijuana
twentieth century, this is one of those instances where the Court is
bound to act.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are times when the United States Supreme Court must
assert its countermajoritarian role to protect the rights of individuals.
The Court's recent reluctance to recognize new substantive due process
rights is understandable, especially given the compelling state interests
involved in such issues as physician-assisted suicide, abortion, and the
removal of life support. None of these compelling interests, however,
are present in the case of William Cohen. All of the valid state
concerns regarding marijuana use could easily be satisfied by moving
it to Schedule II.
Likewise, Mr. Cohen has a fundamental right to be free from
severe pain during the final stages of a terminal illness, and has the
right to follow the advice of a competent physician on how best to
relieve that pain. Justice Sanders, the lone dissenter in the Supreme
Court of Washington's recent medical marijuana decision, posed the
proper question when he asked how long members of the legislature
would bear the plaintiffs pain before recognizing the arbitrariness of
the law.'" 6
Ultimately, the political process is the preferable forum to resolve
this issue. But there is every reason to believe that, if left to the
political process, there will be no change. Even if the states continue
to pass initiatives allowing for medicinal marijuana use, the federal
government has made it clear that it will not allow such laws to disrupt
national policy. The Court is the only avenue of redress for William
Cohen and others who are similarly situated. Their process is long
overdue.
156. See Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 803, 940 P.2d at 631 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
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